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could be elaborated which lay not in
science or esthetics but at the interface
between them; but for this to be
possible such a system would have to
. be developed in its own right.

Medical Data and Applied Ethics ·
Part II*
The Sources of Data
Edmond A. Murphy, M.D., Sc.D.

In exploring the second of our
. problems - the analysis of the sources
·of information - it will be necessary
to brush -aside all the semantic difficulties considered previously. To
illustrate certain principles about the
sources of data and how they operate,
it will be necessary to pretend that
there are no epistemological difficulties over the use of such words as
"cancer", or "disease".
It will also, I hope, be evident that
the kinds of difficulties connected
with determining the facts about
disease, apply equally to what has

*PaTt I was printed in the August,
l969 Linacre Quarterly.
Dr. Murphy received his M.D. degree
from Queen's University, Belfast,
Ireland. John Hopkins University
awarded him the Sc.D in Biostatistics
and he is Associate Professor of
Medicine and Biostatistics at John
Hopkins. His principal areas of interests have been in vascular disease,
genetics, and the theoretical aspects of
scientific inference.
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been . discovered about psych<
education or moral problems b
same method of inference. It is <
first importance to realize that
rules apply to all knowledge defr
on empirical grounds alone.

1gy,
the
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•ese
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It must not be supposed tha. 1ny
exclusive claims are being made f, the
value or the cogency of scie ific
evidence. There are doubtless .my
other channels through which 1· ) Wledge can be attained. But the
epistemological defense for the sc .ndness of a conclusion must rest squ -ely
in some field. A painter might dim
that Rembrandt was a great ·tist
because of his development of
chiaroscuro; and a political tht ~ r ist
might claim he was a great ·tist
because of his recognition of the
dignity of the common man. · o a
scientist - in the abstract sense Jf a
narrow specialist - both con te n, ions
would be unintelligible, now , and
perhaps permanently. That this "<ind
of rigid compartmentalizing of knowledge does not occur in practicP reflects the broadmindedness of the
specialist. But the rigorous exawjnation of such a claim must be undertaken within some scheme of criticism.
It may be that a system of de fe nse

Linacre Quarterly

. Suppose that some pastoral theologian expresses some opinion about,
let us say, the effects of Catholic
education or the dangers of ·mixed
marriages. Insofar as his opinion
depends on , for example, infused
knowledge or on some deductions
from a scriptural source , then he will
meet no criticism from me and I must
leave it to his peers to decide whether
his conclusions are sound. But if he
claims that his conclusion is based on
scientific inference from experience ,
th~n in its empirical mode his conclusion must be subject to the kinds of
discipline discussed here. I do not
deny (neither do I affirm) that certain
men of great holiness or percipience
can arrive at pastoral wisdom which
transcends the scientifically imperfect
sources of their information. But such
arguments leave me a little nervous if
for no other reason then that formal
demonstration of the truth of these
conclusions is wanting. It has been a
common belief within the medical
profession that an analgous kind of
transcendental wisdom can be attained
in clinical matters. But where formal
scientific studies have subsequently
been performed, the beliefs arrived at
by this method have distressingly
often proved false . I hope it will not
be thought an unduly hostile comment
to say that most, perhaps all, of the
experience and the pastoral wisdom
which the Church has built up over the
ages, viewed · strictly as scientific
evidence is almost all unsound.
The cardinal problem which besets
the scientist who wishes to establish
demonstrable truth, arises from the
inductive nature of his discipline. The
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sCientist capitalizes on the fact that
there is some, not necessarily perfect,
uniformity in the behavior of sensible
phenomena. In principle all the facts
that he needs to know can be found
by direct observation except, of
course, those facts which are beyond
the resolving power of the available
means of observation~ An engineer
wishing to decide whether a particular
design of bridge will stand up or fall
· down, can always build it and see. But,
apart from the expense and the danger
of this method, any self-respecting
engineer would view it with professional dissatisfaction; he would feel
that such an approach does not do
justice to the extent of the organization in the theoretiCal aspects of his
field. Now clearly any alternative to
this "try-it-and-see" approach implies
a belief that natural phenomenon ·can
be described in terms which are less
numerous than the facts collected i.e. data can be reduced. This belief
cannot be demonstrated, though it
seems evident that if it were false,
policies predicated on it would lead,
sooner or later, to failure. But if this
belief be granted, the recognition of
truth in any particular field by empirical means is based on two conditions: -

.,··:·

·.

1) That there be sufficient experi-:ence in the field; and
2) That what experience there is, be
representative.
The violation of these principles
leads on the one hand to problems of
sampling error, and on the other hand
to problems of bias. The two are not
mutually exClusive in that they may
coexist, but they differ fundamentally.
The difference can perhaps be best
illustrated by simple if rather transparent examples.
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Example I. A surgeon after performing some new and elaborate
operation successfully three times
might be led to claim that the mortality rate is zero and that the operation
is without risk to life. Now one needs
no sophisticated scientific training to
recognize that such a · claim is
excessive. Even - assuming that the
surgeon has not selected his patients, it
may well be that just by change he has
each time picked patients with a good
operative risk. His sample by common
consent is too small for such a confident generalization. The only remedy
is a more extensive experience. In his
further cases; of course, the surgeon
may go on being lucky. But the larger
his experience the less likely it is that
· his success is attributable to good luck
alone. There is always some possibility
of this explanation; but with large
numbers and uniform success, the
reasonable interpretation would be
that the risk is in fact small. Formal
exploration of this point by statistical
theory sustains the conclusions of
common sense.
However, it is important not to get
carried away in one's criticism. A
commonplac-e comment is that, "You
can tell nothing from three cases".
This is manifest nonsense. However
uncertain conclusions based on such a
limited experience, any data are a vast
-improvement on none at all. It is
nonetheless true that the uncertainties
associated with sampling can be progressively attenuated by increasing the
size of the sample.
Example II. Now by contrast,
consider the therapeutic nihilist - an
internist perhaps - who is convinced
that some common operation is extremely dangerous. Since he does not
have direct access to the surgeon's
patients, he arranges with a pathologist
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to be notified every time one of th se
patients, ·who underwent the opt= ·ation, comes to autopsy. On the b: .tis
of the information obtained from t 1is
source he proposes to asses the risk ~ of
the operation. It is surely obvious t at
all those coming to autopsy are de !d;
and since the nihilist gains no ·xperience of any other kind of case , he
concludes that the mortality rate is
100%.

to consider all those admitted or some kind of a systematically. collected sampfe of them. If the
mortality rate is 10% then for every
case going to the morgue, nine will be
discharged eventually: and the
sampling procedure should reflect
these proportions. The investigator
cannot simply collect his data in a
hap-hazard way and hope that the
proportions will come out right.

(Of course, if his informant l ad
been the administrator who arra . ;es
for taxis to transport the pati nt
home, then he would be aware onl) of
the patients who survive; and hew tld
conclude that the mortality ratr is
zero percent.)

How a sampling method is best used
in an individual case is a complicated
subject (1 ,2) which could not possibly
be dealt with here even in outline. The
points that matter are to be aware of
the importance of representativeness
and to recognize that non-representativeness (or bias) is not cured by
taking a large sample; the statistician
may be able to adjust for the effects of
bias if the nature of the bias is known.
But there are many cases which cannot
be cured by any analytical finesse.

Such methods of ascertainment , J<e
the observations from small samr es,
also lead to erroneoqs conclusions, ~ ut
for quite different reasons. Here tl !re
is a systematic error in the selectior of
cases, one which large numbers wil · do
nothing to correct. Mortality r tes
based on 10,000 patients coming, to
autopsy will be just as erroneou~ as
those based on three patients o: ly,
and for precisely the same re a~ Jn.
Such a systematic error is calle. a
bias. The basic fault is that the san le
on which the conclusions are b ~ ing
based is not representative of the
population about which the general zation is being made. It may be accid, ntally true that the autopsy patients are
representative because it may be at
the particular operation is invari<.qly
fatal. But this will rarely be true md
the whole point at issue is whe her
such is the case or not.
This problem of obtaining re resentative (as distinct from adequately
large) samples must be rriet by exact
ideas and methods. To decide the fate
of patients undergoing operation A, at
a particular hospital* it would be
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To bring all this a little closer to
home, let us apply it to a hypothetical
pastoral example. Suppose that the
pastoral theologian wanted _to express
an opinion as to whether the miniskirt
is a scandalous garment. He could , of
course' base his opinion on his own
individual reactions. But generally , I
think his opinion would be formed in
the light of what the average person's
reaction was. Now how would he get
information about the reactions of the
average person? The confessional
would be a poor source. The matter
will be raised in the confessional for
the most part by people to whom it
has been either an occasion or a source
of sin. Such people may represent a
small proportion of the population
only. If such a garment were a source
of virtue to some , perhaps large ,
segme~t of the population - and as

someone trying to make a balanced
judgment, the theologian could hardly
dismiss this possibility out of hand then the means of collecting information will be silent on the point.
Graham Greene has made the point
well.
" ... A priest only knows the unimportant
things".
"Unimportant"?
"Oh, I mean the sins", he said impatiently.
"A man doesn't come to us and confess his
virtues". (3)

The collection of information in the
confessional is closely allied to that of
the nihilist who is opposed to the
surgical operation. The only information obtained at all is to the detriment
of the garment and the defect is not
remedied by collecting a vast amount
of information. The experiences of
fifty pastors hearing confessions will
merely be the bias of one magnified
fifty times.
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The second line of information
might be those who come to consult
the priest outside the confessional.
This source would be perhaps a little
better since it is not quite so closely
concerned with sin ; but the improvement would be only slight. A priest in
such a situation might build up an
extensive experience; but it would be
an extensive experience of certain
kinds of person. There is no reas_on to
suppose them representative and
indeed a good deal of reason to
suppose the contrary.
Much of this, .of course, does not
matter. In the difficult area of purity
the usual practice has been to treat
penitents individually, recognizing that
what may be quite harmless to one may not be to another. Yet the problem of modesty in dress (which does
not involve one person only) cannot

*There is, of course, no reason for supposing that the e~perience 'in this hospital is
representative of that in hospitals generally.
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be dealt with in these terms. And, at
least in the past, there has been an
almost total disregard for this principle
of individuality in the censorship of
films and books. In neither case, to my
knowledge, has there ever been any
pretence of consulting representative
members of the laity before passing
judgment.
The next phase of the problem arises
out of this very notion of individualism. However necessary it may be to
"tailor-make" spiritual direction in
practice, it would be unmanageable in
theory. If books on morals are to be
written at all, then I suppose that they
must contain broad principles.
But a generalization always involves
some distortion of the truth and in
general, the more extensive if is the
greater the distortion. The statement,
"University professors are highly educated people", is only roughly true:
there are exceptions. But in the
generalization "Most white-collar
workers are moderatley well educated", the exceptions are more numerous and differ more widely from the
average state. The second generalization of course deals with a larger and,
necessarily, more heterogeneous group
of people.
Thus the objectives of generality
(simplicity) and accuracy are in conflict; conditions which favor the one
a.re inimical to the other. In the nature
of things a compromise is necessary.
Grouping or "stratification" may be
used in an attempt to produce groups
which are more or less homogeneous
and yet large enough to avoid those
problems arising from small samples
considered earlier. They should be
numerous enough for the generalizations to be reasonably accurate, and
yet not so numerous as to make it

difficult to detect any bro a(
trends.

rer-all

For example, the preval\
coronary disease are not the
all ages. A common practi
compute prevalences in
grouped by age at intervals o
ten years. This arrangement n•
requirements pretty well; an d
of sufficient simplicity to all<
general statements as that tht
is rare before the age of 30 ,
the prevalence increases stead .
age. Both these facts would c
have been missed if prevale1
been computed without regan :
and if no grouping had been er.
at all, but individual patients c
been studied, the relationship
would · be much more diffi
appreciate by inspection espec
view of the fact that the nun;
persons at risk also changes v.
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For example, official · figures may
that the prevalence · of lung
cer in country A is 2%. This may
a sound figure , and from certain
dpoints, a useful one. A health
llaldn1inist1rator in deciding how exthe provision which must be
for the problems of lung cancer
would find such information useful.
country B, on the other hand,
prevalence may be 4% and this
-,:::~ ...-~ will also be of value to the
• aldrrtini.stration.

!ogies
r will
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from
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But to push these figures futher is to
danger. The propagandist in
- ~·~··~ ...... A, either through stupidity or
- ...... ,~"·""sty, may attempt to prove , by
. ,:onlp::trir:tg these figures, that A is a
.,.,~aJLuu.~~ country to live in than B. But
may be that there are more elderly
• t>eoole in country B; and since cancer
affects older rather than younger
patients, it is hardly to be wondered at
that lung cancer is also more common.
would be the case even if the two
countries did not differ from each
r in any other respect whatsoever
than age composition.

A common statement is to the ..ffect
that "you can prove anything. with
statistics:" and the claim is ; und
provided that what has been prc·ved is
capable of statistical exploratio 1 and
also of course, provided that it i\ true.

But there is more to it than that.
The question arises as to why people
·country B should be older; and
are all sorts of possible reasons.
may be that the younger people in
country B are moving to country A,
thus changing the composition of the
two populations. It may be that A has

Again, I am sure pastoral ar
to this heterogeneity of behav
.leap to mind. Men's moral p1
are different from womens', ch:
from adults' and longshoreme n
those of professors of de
theology. In particular, if one
in the light of scientific critieria
down broad principles of C\
deduced from ~mpirical data, t
would be necessary to collect in
tion in such a way that by anal~
risk for each group, and eve
each patient*, could be deter
separately.

*There are elaborate statistical methods which allow risk to be assessed without gro:Jping.
(4,5)
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the implication that one can prove
which are untrue can only be
d on prejudice or on having exrienced the results of the perversion ·
statistical method. Probably the
mmonest perversion is the misuse of
ralizations about heterogeneous
ulations. This is not to say that no
a.em!ralli'J~ations are possible in such
. But they are apt to be brittle .
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a bigger

birthrate than B. But it may
even be that B is a less healthy country
than A and that more people are dying
young from other diseases; in consequence they do not live long enough
to acquire cancer.
It must be obvious that no useful
conclusions can be arrived at about the
healthiness of the two countries unless
one of two conditions is met: -

1} The two populations are identical in all other respects
or
2) Extraneous differences have been
allowed for.
Even where this requirement has
been met the scientist can rarely know
it or can even be fairly sure. The
exception is where in a deliberate
study · he has randomly assigqed
members from the same population to
the two "subpopulations" A and B
and thereafter has introduced the
difference of interest between the two
experimental groups.
Now, to revert to the problem of
cancer rates in the two populations, if
there is a free system of emigration, A
and B are · more-or-less self-selected
populations: there is no reason to
believe that they are equivalent to
random assignations and good grounds
to believe the contrary.
Those who emigrate from B to A
may be the more ambitious and intelligent, and theref9re likely to be
successful. In consequence of both
intelligence and prosperity, they may
maintain better standards of personal
hygiene and thus have a lower risk of
cancer. But this is not a reflection of
the environment of country A, merely
of the fruits of intelligence and wealth;
and the prevalence of cancer might be
no higher in a comparable group in A.
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For this reason the analysis of
spontaneously formed groups is always
more treacherous) and-the conclusions
arrived at surrounded by much more
uncertainty, .than for experimental
studies of subjects who have been
deliberately grouped in accordance
with some systematic scheme of
allocation.
CONCLUSIONS
What are the important lessons from
all this?
First, in any <::xercise in empirical
inference, it is ne,;:;essary to defme the
. population of interest. This must be
done explicitly and before the event.
Deciding on the population of interest
after the data have been inspected,
creates problems of the logic of inference which cannot be discussed here.
Secondly, where only part of the
population is studied, the random
sampling procedure must be carefully
and expliCitly thought out. The word
"random" has a precise technical
meaning - for in~;tance it implies that
before the sample has been selected
the probability of any one person
being included is specified. Anything
less must be labelled "haphazard" and
cannot be used as the basis for any
~ound non-trivial scientific inference.
Certain trivial inferences can be
made. A physician in practice, deriving
his patients from an unspecified
source, who sees :l patient with hypernephroma in country C, can thereafter
claim that this car.cer is "not unknown
in C". Or a priest may know from the
confessional, th~.t drinking vinegar
may excite somf people to simony
because he had encountered such a
case. But if the :tepresentativeness of
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the samples . is unknown no
~ful
conclusions about frequencie s are
possible.
Thirdly, in comparing two po' ulations, account must be taken of any
extraneous differences. Thus, i• we
wish to explore the effect of smc' :ing
on lung cancer by comparing po ula- ·
tions A and B, then adjustment mst
be made for all pertinent differe tees
between A and Bother than their s1 oking habits. Of course in any real s :uation it is not known what diffen ces
are petinent. In consequence logi 1lly
certain or compelling conclusio n ~ are
not possible and all results of this ind
must be accepted with reservat ns.
This logical difficulty can be cift 1mvented if the two populations ca be
assigned randomly from the f tme
population. But in many , per aps
most, situations either for moral, ] al,
political or logistic reasons it is ot
possible to do so , and the scie tist
must needs have recourse to se(. md
class evidence. But the exiger ;ies
arising from the system should r :ver
lead one to represent the scier ific
soundness of that evidence availab :; as
better than it is.
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Part III
The Interpretation of Evidence
· In this third and last discussion
attention will be centered on the
interpretation of data. To some slight
extent, this matter has been discussed
in the second paper of the series. But
the motivation is different. Comparison of cancer rates in countries A and
8 was used as an illustration of the
importance of defming the population
and specifying the sampling procedure.
But in this paper we will assume not
only that there are no semantic and
ontological difficulties but also that
the sources of the data are beyond
reproach. We still have the further
problem of how we are to interpret
what we have found. The subject is a
vast one; but by way of illustration we
shal) consider two major sources of
difficulty and error - on the one hand
confounqing, on the other correlation
and the" implications it has for
causation.
CONFOUNDING
Suppose some new drug fo r the
treatment of rheumatoid arthritis has
been introduced. We give it to some
patient with the disease and twentyfour hours later he feels better and has ·
less pain; his fever has abated; objective measurements show that he has
appreciably greater mobility in his
joints and certain abnormal blood tests
are more nearly normal. The unwary
might be led to conclude that this is a
triumphant demonstration of the
therapeutic value of the drug; and they
would be more than ever convinced if
this experience was repeate d in say 14
out of the first 20 patients on whom
the drug was tried.
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But this conclusion is logically unsound. Suppose we consider another
more transparent example . To a group
. of 50 normal adult people we administer 50 mg of Vitamin C at 11 p.m.
and 45 of them have a sound night~s
sleep. This proves that Vitamin C is a
successful hypnotiC in most cases. The
fallacy in this conclusion is, needless
to say , that most of the 50 people
would have had a sound night~s sleep
anyway , and for all we know the
preparation might be completely inert.
The example demonstrates what
should be our watchword in all such
cases.

..

~:·

..

...
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Do we know what would have
happened if the treatment had not
been given?

If so , does what has happened on
treatment differ from what happens in
the spontaneous course of the disease?
It comes as something of a surprise to
most lay ·people and to many doctors
to fmd that in few cases can we answer
these questions with any accuracy. At
least two major difficulties exist. First,
readers of text books commonly have
concealed from them just how little
hard fact there is about the natural
history of disease and the factors
which modify it·: this is true even for
common diseases. A second and more
insidious matter is that the very existence of an effective treatment
modifies the kind of patient who
comes to the doctor's attention. It is a
general (and not unexpected) truth
that doctors are more likely to be on
the alert for diseases which can be
cured or at least adequately treated.
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Tuberculosis for instance offers the
best chance of cure with the minimum
of scarring if diagnosis and treatment
are early. But it is also known that
most tuberculous infections, if left to
themselves, will heal spontaneously.
Thus by treating early, many patients
the physician is treating would have
recovered in any case. By diagnosing
late, the physician is recognizing those
cases who have not healed spontaneously and are unlikely to do so. Thus
the two kinds of patients are not
comparable. If the duration of survival
is to be the criterion, of cour~e, a more
subtle bias is at work. Other things
being equal if diagnosis is made six
months earlier, then survival from
diagnosis will be :;ix months longer.

In the face of all this, could we say
what would have happened to the
patients with rheumatoid arthritis if
they had not received the. new treatment? Have we any evidence that what
we have observe(. is not a spontaneous
remission? The logical structure of the
experiment is su;h that the effects of
the drug cannot be distinguished from
spontaneous changes in the disease.
This relationship is a special case of
confounding of effects. The word is of
course cognate with "confusion" and
the statement is equivalent to saying
that two sets of effects are confused
one with another: they are "poured
together" like whiskey and soda. Without information from outside sources
it is logically impossible to tell
whether the whi~ :key or the soda is the
intoxicating ingn dient.

It is generally the case that in a

study, one variable is of interest while
the other variables are "contaminating" or "nuisance" variables. For the
most part, confounding is difficult to
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avoid and considerable ingenuit · m d
p~rceptiveness may be requir~ to
crrcumvent it. A few instance ~. Jay
make it clear.

1) Injections of compound X r1
asthmatic attacks and this may
property of X. But it may not
physical ,process of sticking a nee
a patient may have this effect ; c
physician, . by his manner, rna ·
fluence patients by suggestion;
may be the solution in . which
dissolved which is the active part.
there are at least three variable s
founded with the variable of int
(compound X).

eve
ea

gastrectomies only in those patients in ·
whom the lesser operation fails; or the
hospital in which N works may be less
well equipped and staffed; or N may
take mainly patients of some special
racial group , or social group, or a
religious group who do not approve of
blood transfusion.

l~he

~

in
the
in: it
. is
,ere
onest,

2) A patient with rheum id
arthritis is instructed to take wo
drugs: X before breakfast andY , ter.
The treatment is only moder ely
effective. After one month the
physician reverses the order in v ich
the drugs are to be taken an( the
benefit is greatly increased. rhe
change may be spontaneous md
nothing to do with either regim< of
treatment; or remission may ave
occurred because Y is being : ven
early ; or X late; or both; or it m< ' be
that X is what really is producini the
effect but it must in some wa be
protected by the prior action c Y.
Here at least four effects are } ~ ing
confounded.
3) Surgeon M treats his pati. . ts'
peptic ulcers by gastrectomy, whr :eas
surgeon N treats them by comb ed
gastrojejunostomy and vagotom} M
gets the better results. But this .. oes
not necessarily mean that gastrect )my
is the better operation. Perhaps ;A is
the better surgeon. Perhaps N has
referred to him the more seriousi v ill
patients; it is maybe that N prefeJ-s to
do the less radical operation and does
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4) As an illustration of the · pertinence of this phenomenon in other
fields, we might consider again the
effects of Catholic education. Suppose
it could be shown that the lapse rate is
lower among the alumni than in those
attending undenominational schools.
Superficially it might appear that this
demonstrates that Catholic education
is safer. But what kind of people
attend Catholic schools? Inasmuch as
the general teaching of the Church has
been that Catholic education if not
compulsary is at least warmly recommended, the parents who are more
loyal and more respectful of authority
will tend to send their children to
Catholic schools. So will more prosperous parents. Moreover, it may be that
the future careers of the alumni may
be different because , in some countries
at least, there has been more emphasis
on the humanities and less on the
sciences in Cat holic schools. There are
thus several sources of confounding:
sufficient, in my opinion, to make the
whole inference , from the empirical
standpoint, doubtful unless at the very
least , suitable adjustment s can be
made for these distortions.
What can
confounding?

be

d one

Secondly, at least in experimental
work, random allocation of cases to
the various treatments should be used
wherever possible. In default of this,
the evidence must always be regarded
as imperfect.
Thirdly , except in those rare cases
where the natural behavior of the
disease (or whatever the phenomenon
being studied) is well known for the
circumstances in which the present
study is to be conducted then a
"control" sample should be studied.
Thus., if we wish to find the effect of
cortisone injections on asthmatic
patients, we should have, simultaneously and under the same conditions, a ·
comparable group of asthmatics who
receive injections of some inert preparation such as the fluid in which the
cortisone has been dissolved. Where
possible , the asthmatics should be
randomly assigned to the two groups;
and for preference neither the patient
nor the doctor assessing his progress
should know which preparation the
patient is receiving ("a double-blind
experiment.") By this means confounding of the effects of the drug
with the effects of suggestion can be
largely avoided.

about

· Perhaps the most important step is
to be aware of the phenomenon and to
bear it continually in mind. The
watchword must alway be , "Is there
any factor other than the one in which
we are interested which could account
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for the effect which has been observed?" Alternative explanations
however implausible, must be discard~
ed with circumspection and, in strict
practice, only in the light of clear
positive evidence.

Failing these niceties, adjustment
should be made in the analysis for
variables confounded with the main
one , or at least such of these variables
as are believed important. Classical
factors which are considered are
differences in age, sex, race, education,
social class; occupation and stage of
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the disease. Other factors will suggest
themselves in the. individual case. The
technic of aqjustment may be very
complicated and need not concern us
here. The main point is that such
methods do exist; and the services of a
competent statistician should be enlisted where necessary.

ASSOCIATION AND CORRELATION
Much of inference in certain fields
such as epidemiology depends on
recognizing that an association exists
between two phenomena. By an
"association" we mean that they occur
together more often than can be
accounted for by chance. Thus, there
is a positive association between tonsilitis and r}leumatic fever: those with
sore throats are more likely to get
rheumatic fever. Conversely those who
have had vaccinia (i.e. have been
"vaccinated") are less likely to get
smallpox: thus there is a negative
association between these diseases.
Where the entities being considered
are continuous variables, nonindependence between them is usually
expressed as a correlation. Thus there
is a positive cor-r elation between height
and weight. On the average, tall men
are heavier than short men. Conversely
the. size of the heart is negatively
correlated with expectation of life: on
the average' the larger the heart the
worse the prognosis. Note that these
statements refer to averages only .and
are highly fallible in the individual
cases.
The actual technics by which significant associations and correlations are
demonstrated are beside the point.
What is important is their interpretation. All the above examples quoted
have been fairly well worked out. But

it will be illuminating to consider
examples in which the nature of the
relationship is in doubt.
It has been repeatedly shown that if
a group of men age , say, 40 to 60, wh
have had a coronary thombosis, be
compared with a group of similar me r;
of the same age, they have on tht.
average a higher blood cholestero;
level. This association can be interpret
ed according to three classes o;
·theories. ·

1) A high serum cholesterol (C
promotes the development of throm
bosis (T) or perhaps of the arteria
disease which gives rise to it. To tes
this kind of theory we could explon
whether C was present before t.
2) Coronary thrombosis cause ;
certain body reaction among whicJ
high blood cholesterol is one, much a ;
pneumonia causes a fever.
3) Finally we could argue that bot]
C and T are separate consequences
some other unspecified factor. Fo
instance it might be that the kind o ·
person who gets coronary disease als<•
has high cholesterol. There is reason t<;
believe that emotional stress affect ;
both ; so, probably, does social class; s' >
does exercise.
Now logically there is nothing tn
choose between these three and I·
personally am not convinced in the
case of coronary disease and bloo
cho-lesterol, that the matter has been
resolved though I know many
scientists would not agree with me.
But if we represent these · diagrammatically denoting "A causes B" by
"A~B" and indicating the unknow
primordial mechanism by X then it

be clear that we have exhausted

1)

x~c-+T

2)

x~T-+C

3)

x1 T

\c

The dimension s of the problem
dly mounts in complexity. Three
I.,Jtertont1er1a which have been shown to
associated (or correlated) can be
•• r·r ...,.,..,.d in sixteen causal pathways;
·phenomena in 125 ways; six in
ly seventeen thousand. The lesson
clearly that the interpretation of
ch ·relationships is complex. It might
course be that many , perhaps most ,
such scheme s could not be squared
the subsidiary evidence . But the
means of ensuring that no plaushypothesis is overlooked is to
down all possible combinations
consider them individually.

It would be a mistake , however , to
that this is the method which
sensible scientist would use to
the uncertainty. Something
like this pro blem is dealt with by
biochemist who is trying to dea metabolic pathway i.e. the
of steps by which one comis converte d to another. The
questions have in common that
deal with t he order of phenornrelated to one another ; in the one
·it is a matter of which is the
terior to which in time , in the other
which is anterior etiologically .
exactly the latter notion is to be
rpreted philosophically I do not
. But certain it is that the

scientist always behaves as if "etiology" had a perfectly definite meaning.
If one can make . the statement
"A-+B", then manipulating A should
change B, but the converse is not true.
And the classical notion of causality
implies at least this.
Now the biochemist in his metabolic
problem reduces its complexity by
fragmenting the tree and studying the
small fragments. The man exploring
causal pathways must needs do the
same. The tree-drawing approach has
the defect that it is purely static ; the
efficient approach and indeed the only
one which can provide cogent evidence
on causality is of its very nature
dynamic i.e. causality is inferred from
watching wheter changes in A (for
preference deliberate manipulations)
are followed by changes in B or vice

·.·

·..

versa.
Spontaneous dynamic changes
provide more information than static ,
but they are still suspect. We would
not argue that because , to the observer, lightening preceeds thunder it-is
the cause and. thunder the effect.
So much of the contentions of the
historians are, I suspect, to be traced
to their failure to grasp the inadequacy
of their evidence on dynamic relationships which are merly spontaneous and
not deliberately manipulated. The
resources of the historian , like those of
the astronomer and ' the archeologist,
are of course limited by the nature of
the subject.

! ; .

I

>

,.
CONCLUSIONS
I think perhaps I will leave it at that.
The conclusions -are clear and. easily
. ·~ .
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stated. First that there is usually an
embarrassment of hypotheses. Secondly, that no sound conclusions about
causality can be made in a static
system. Tentative conclusions may be
reached from studying spontaneous
dynamic changes. But cogent conclusions can only be reached from
deliberate experimental manipulations.
The heavy emphasis on training in
the so-called exact sciences as a preliminary to biological and medical
training has the disadvantage that it
provides no education in dealing with
the intricacies of biological systems.
The hiatus arises in two ways. In the
first place , elementary courses in
physics and chemistry deal much more
in fact than in method. The centimeter-gr-am-second system of measurement which is taken for granted by the
student, in fact represents a triumph
of analysis ·arrived at by centuries of
grappling with the constructs of
physics and challenged again by the
developments of relativity. The
student too often gains no insight into
such reductions and is perhaps · left
with the illusion that they are easy to
make. In the second place, the basic
sciences are . dealing with structurally
very simple ideas. The physiologist
deals, or attempts to deal , with description and analysis of the flow of
blood in the arteries, a problem which
the physicist views with horror. The
· histochemist has as his objective the
description of the chemistry of the
cell, a matter which the organic

chemist would dismiss as in tracta} ly
complex,
A 'high level' exploration of
problems is not necessarily a was ed
effort , but it must be conducted in its
own terms and in accordance with its
own disciplines. These discipli es
many biologists and physiciaJliS ne 1er
.learn. In consequence they commo ly
misconstrue the evidence presented to
·them and take or recommend incorrect courses of action. No physi an
would argue that fever causes pn ~ u
monia simply because · the two tre
associated; and though he may t ke
steps to cool his patient it is ot
intended as a curative measure but ; s a
means of alleviating a distressing . : nd
sometimes dangerous manifestatior of
the disease. Likewise he would lot
recommend a low calcium diet in
tuberculosis simply because calciur 1 is
commonly present in tubercul JUS
lesions. Yet a large number of phy .;icians (it seems to me on no rr· )fe
cogent basis) treat atherosclerosis t y a
low cholesterol diet.
As illustrations of two comr on
sources of erroneous inference vye I- iVe
discussed confounding and associat Jn.
There is some simularity bet\\ ~ en
them; they both give rise to mul1 pie
interpretations of results which cai be
distinguished only (if at all) by ap >eal
to outside information. In both C< ses,
however , ethical or legal obstacles . nay
preclude the critical experiment. t oth
have their analogies in the pastor. I as
well as in the scientific sphere.

.
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c) United States of America:
Previously , we have considered, with
reference to Japan and the various
geographical sections of Europe, reform legislation concerning the moral
and social problem of abortion. We
endeavored to set forth the date
and type of the reform legislation and
to assess its impact particularly on the
numbers of legal and illegal abortions,
the relationship between the total
numbers of abortions to . the total
numbers of live births, the problem of
maternal mortality and we have tried
to evaluate the influence of the new
legislation and its results on the citizens' attitudes towards the preservation or the taking of innocent, unborn

life.
I) Legislative Arena:
We must now turn our attention to
the United States of America.

Msgr. Ha"ington is Vice-Officialis,
the Archdiocese of Boston.
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The current drive to change existing
abortion statutes began in earnest in
this country in 1966. In that year,
Mississippi adopted a more liberal
statute. Legislative change occurred in
1967 in the states of Colorado, North
Carolina and California; in 1968 in
Georgia and Maryland and in 1969 in
Arkansas, Kansas, New Mexico and
Delaware. 1
What is interesting and important to
note is that, despite a well-coordjnated, well-financed, highly motivated
and determined campaign by the
proponents of more liberal · abortion
laws, who incidentally had the media
of communication - radio, television,
newspapers, professional journals,
popular magazines etc. at their disposal and on their side - only ten
states succeeded in four legislative
years in changing t~eir laws.
This fact indicates to this writer that
there just is no tremendous groundswell among large numbers of peoples
in these United States to liberalize our
current conservative statutes. And yet,
one of the principal arguments of the
proponents is that the present statutes
should be changed because so many
citizens want change. In public dis-
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